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THE ROAD ALSO TAKEN: LESSONS FROM
ORGANIC AGRICULTURE FOR MARKETAND RISK-BASED REGULATION
DONALD T. HORNSTEIN†
INTRODUCTION
In hindsight, the year 1990 was a crossroads in environmental
and regulatory policy generally and in the regulation of food
specifically. And two different narratives capture the competing
regulatory choices presented at that crossroads. The first, a
conventional narrative, finds mounting evidence of what many regard
as the dominant avenues of regulatory reform in environmental
policymaking: market-based incentives and risk-based decisionmaking.1 The second, alternative narrative finds the signs of a much
more fundamental reform project.
Under the conventional narrative, 1990 is often remembered for
amendments to the Clean Air Act that inaugurated the country’s
largest experiment with constructed environmental markets—a

Copyright © 2007 by Donald T. Hornstein.
† Aubrey L. Brooks Distinguished Professor of Law, University of North Carolina
School of Law.
1. The literature on reforming environmental law and policy with the use of market-based
incentives is large. See, e.g., Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Putting the Market to Work for
Conservation: The Evolving Use of Market-Based Mechanisms to Achieve Environmental
Improvement In and Across Multiple Media, 14 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 151 (2006); E. Donald
Elliott, Environmental Markets and Beyond: Three Modest Proposals for the Future of
Environmental Law, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 245 (2001); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and
the Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607 (2000); Richard B. Stewart,
Models for Environmental Regulation: Central Planning Versus Market-Based Approaches, 19
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 547 (1992). The literature on reforming environmental law through
various forms of risk analysis is equally large. See, e.g., Matthew B. Adler, Against “Individual
Risk”: A Sympathetic Critique of Risk Assessment, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1121 (2005); Steve P.
Calandrillo, Responsible Regulation: A Sensible Cost-Benefit, Risk Versus Risk Approach to
Federal Health and Safety Regulation, 81 B.U. L. REV. 957 (2001); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Risk
in the Republic, 8 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 1 (1997); David A. Dana, Review Essay, Setting
Environmental Priorities: The Promise of a Bureaucratic Solution, 74 B.U. L. REV. 365 (1994).
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2
nationwide “cap-and-trade” sulfur dioxide market now fêted not
only as a template for a worldwide market in greenhouse gases3 but
also as a model for the development of more far-reaching markets in
4
ecosystem services. The year is also recalled for the qualified
endorsement given quantitative and comparative risk assessment by
the Environmental Protection Agency’s Science Advisory Board
5
(SAB). Thereafter, the SAB’s report would be cited frequently for
evidence that risk-based environmental regulation was an idea whose
time had come.6
In the regulation of food, it was easy to see in 1990 the influence
of these conventional reforms, especially the prevalence of risk-based
regulation. Two highly visible controversies over food—one domestic
and one international—were largely framed and resolved in terms of
risk assessment. Domestically, 1990 marked the conclusion of a
regulatory battle over the pesticide daminozide (known by its trade
name, Alar) in which the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
the Uniroyal Corporation (Alar’s chief manufacturer), and
environmental groups each contested the safety of Alar through

2. Clean Air Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 101-549, sec. 401, §§ 401–416, 104 Stat. 2399,
2584–631 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2000)); see also Brennan Van Dyke, Note,
Emissions Trading to Reduce Acid Deposition, 100 YALE L.J. 2707 (1991).
3. See, e.g., Jennifer Yelin-Kefer, Note, Warming Up to an International Greenhouse Gas
Market: Lessons from the U.S. Acid Rain Experience, 20 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 221 (2001); Isabel
Rauch, Developing a German and an International Emissions Trading System—Lessons from
U.S. Experiences with the Acid Rain Program, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 307 (2000). But see
Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice in Legal Context,
108 YALE L.J. 677, 775 n.361 (1999) (noting important differences between the U.S. sulfur
dioxide trading program and proposed international greenhouse gas trading markets).
4. See, e.g., Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Markets for Nature, 25 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y REV. 261, 261–62 (2000) (describing emissions trading under the 1990 Clean Air Act
Amendments as an example and precursor to broader experiments with market-like
mechanisms to protect ecosystems).
5. RELATIVE RISK REDUCTION STRATEGIES COMM’N, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY SCI.
ADVISORY BD., REDUCING RISK: SETTING PRIORITIES AND STRATEGIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (1990).
6. See, e.g., Robert F. Blomquist, The EPA Science Advisory Board’s Report on
“Reducing Risk”: Some Overarching Observations Regarding the Public Interest, 22 ENVTL. L.
149, 151 (1992) (“[T]he remarkable SAB report adds significantly to the policy debate
concerning environmental decision making by providing a workable analytical approach to
today’s and tomorrow’s environmental problems.”); John S. Applegate, The Perils of
Unreasonable Risk: Information, Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 261, 284 & n.120 (1991) (citing the SAB report to support a claim of “centrality” of
quantitative risk assessment to EPA policymaking); William Reilly, Taking Aim Toward 2000:
Rethinking the Nation’s Environmental Agenda, 21 ENVTL. L. 1359, 1366 (1991) (referring to
“valuable suggestions” from the SAB report).
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opposing risk-based conclusions involving competing exposure
7
models and dose-response relationships. Internationally, the year
also saw battle lines drawn over hormone-treated beef in a dispute
between the United States, where the addition of hormone growth
implants in livestock was (and still is) common, and the European
Community (EC), which took final steps to implement its ban on
8
imported, hormone-treated meat adopted the previous year. The
battle over beef hormones pitted a risk-based approach to
environmental issues in international trade (the United States’
position) against a precautionary approach (the EC’s position). And,
within the dispute resolution framework of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), the United States’ position would prevail, not
only in the WTO’s eventual decision in 1997 on bovine growth
implants,9 but also in a 2006 dispute between the United States and
Europe over the importation of genetically modified agricultural
10
products.
But in the regulation of food, the alternative narrative is needed
to capture fully other events that also transpired in 1990. Broadly
speaking, this narrative emphasizes the emergence of a cause-based
approach to environmental reform that seeks fundamental changes in
production systems or human behavior to prevent such

7. See, e.g., Marina M. Lolley, Comment, Carcinogen Roulette: The Game Played Under
FIFRA, 49 MD. L. REV. 975, 984–88 (1990) (discussing different childhood exposure periods
used in risk assessments relied on by EPA and environmentalists, different dose-response
factors, and claims by Uniroyal that EPA’s risk assessment contained too many data gaps to
support regulatory action).
8. GEOFFREY S. BECKER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., U.S.-EUROPEAN UNION
AGRICULTURAL TRADE: THE VETERINARY EQUIVALENCY AGREEMENT 2 (1999) (noting that
the EC in 1990 finished “delisting” plants in the United States that produced hormone-treated
meat). The beef hormone dispute is discussed generally in Rosemary A. Ford, The Beef
Hormone Dispute and Carousel Sanctions: A Roundabout Way of Forcing Compliance with
World Trade Organization Decisions, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 543 (2002).
9. The reports of both the WTO’s Hormones Panel and the WTO Appellate Body are
discussed in Vern R. Walker, Keeping the WTO from Becoming the “World Trans-science
Organization”: Scientific Uncertainty, Science Policy, and Factfinding in the Growth Hormones
Dispute, 31 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 251, 296–319 (1998); see also George H. Rountree, Note,
Raging Hormones: A Discussion of the World Trade Organization’s Decision in the European
Union-United States Beef Dispute, 3 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 607 (1999).
10. See WORLD TRADE ORG., EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES—MEASURES AFFECTING THE
APPROVAL AND MARKETING OF BIOTECH PRODUCTS (Sept. 29, 2006), available at
http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/news06_e/291r_e.htm. The WTO’s decision on genetically
modified organisms is discussed in Jonathan G. Dorn, News & Analysis, The Regulation of
Genetically Modified Organisms: Why the Biotech Products Case Is a Win-Win Situation for the
European Union, 37 ENVTL. L. REP. 10225 (Mar. 2007).
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11
environmental harms from arising in the first place. In a weak sense,
Congress captured this alternative approach in the Pollution
Prevention Act of 1990,12 under which EPA was to promote pollution
prevention through various information-based measures and by
13
But this
encouraging source-reduction efforts by industry.
alternative approach was captured more strongly that year by
developments in “alternative agriculture”—which for purposes of this
Essay includes “organic agriculture.”14
The year 1990 was especially important in the development of
federal policy on organic agriculture. In April of that year, the
National Academy of Sciences co-sponsored a workshop on research
15
initiatives in “sustainable agriculture,” following up on a widely
noted National Academy publication from one year earlier,
Alternative Agriculture,16 which found evidence that non-conventional
agricultural systems could markedly reduce environmental
17
degradation without significant loss in agricultural productivity.

11. Examples of cause-based environmental reforms are discussed in Donald T. Hornstein,
Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and Politics of Environmental Law
Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 380–85 (1993).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 13101–13109 (2000). The Pollution Prevention Act is described in E. Lynn
Grayson, The Pollution Prevention Act of 1990: Emergence of a New Environmental Policy, 22
ENVTL. L. REP. 10392 (June 1992).
13. Grayson, supra note 12; see also Stephan M. Johnson, From Reaction to Proaction: The
1990 Pollution Prevention Act, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153 (1992).
14. The term “organic” when affixed as a food label in the United States has a fixed
meaning in terms of compliance with the Organic Food Production Act of 1990. More broadly,
organic agriculture is one of several forms of low-input agriculture that all have in common
either the elimination or reduction of such chemical growing inputs as fertilizers and pesticides.
See infra text accompanying notes 109–12. The various forms of alternative agriculture are
summarized in Hornstein, supra note 11, at 401.
15. Charles M. Benbrook, Introduction to SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE RESEARCH AND
EDUCATION IN THE FIELD: A PROCEEDINGS 1 (Nat’l Acad. of Scis. 1991).
16. See COMM’N ON THE ROLE OF ALTERNATIVE FARMING METHODS IN MODERN PROD.
AGRIC., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE (Nat’l Acad. Press 1989)
[hereinafter ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE]; see also Christopher B. Connard, Comment,
Sustaining Agriculture: An Examination of Current Legislation Promoting Sustainable
Agriculture as an Alternative to Conventional Farming Practices, 13 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV.
125, 136 & n.66 (2004) (citing ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE, supra); Neil D. Hamilton, Feeding
Our Future: Six Philosophical Issues Shaping Agricultural Law, 72 NEB. L. REV. 210, 239 n.134
(1993) (“The book set off an intense controversy in the agricultural community and gave a
major boost in the national conscience to sustainable agriculture.”).
17. ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at 9 (“Reduced use of these [chemical]
inputs lowers production costs and lessens agriculture’s potential for adverse environment and
health effects without necessarily decreasing—and in some case increasing—per acre crop yields
and the productivity of livestock management systems.”).
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Perhaps influenced by these events, Congress passed the Organic
18
Foods Production Act of 1990 (OFPA), as part of the 1990 Farm
Bill.19 The OFPA was, it is safe to say, ironic. It delegated the task of
promulgating a uniform set of standards for organic farmers, the
20
National Organic Program (NOP), to the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA), the historical and administrative epicenter of
21
conventional agriculture in Washington, D.C. Once established, the
NOP would allow organic farmers to market their products under the
nationwide seal, “USDA Organic.”22 After stumbling badly in its
23
initial attempt to implement the delegation, the USDA finally
promulgated regulations for the NOP about a decade later.24
The incorporation of organic agriculture within federal
environmental and agricultural policy was significant. In facilitating
this approach to agriculture, the OFPA brought full circle the deeper
reform project suggested by Rachel Carson almost four decades
earlier upon the publication of her widely influential book, Silent
25
Spring. Several accounts of Silent Spring link its publication to
legislative reforms of the nation’s central pesticide statute, the

18. Organic Foods Production Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat. 3935 (1990)
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6522 (2000)).
19. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-624, 104 Stat.
3359 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 16 U.S.C.).
20. See 7 U.S.C. § 6518 (2000); see also Lauren Zeichner, Product vs. Process: Two
Labeling Regimes for Genetically Engineered Foods and How They Relate to Consumer
Preference, 27 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 467, 473 (2004) (“The remaining details of the
USDA organic certification program were to be developed by the agency, based in part on the
recommendations of the National Organic Standards Board . . . .”); id. at 474 (“In 1997 the
USDA published the first proposed rule, establishing the National Organic Program . . . under
the authority granted by the OFPA.”).
21. See Hornstein, supra note 11, at 423–27 (describing USDA’s generally pro-pesticide
mindset).
22. See Zeichner, supra note 20, at 474.
23. See Michelle T. Friedland, You Call That Organic?—The USDA’s Misleading Food
Regulations, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 379, 383 (2005) (noting that the USDA originally proposed
in 1997 to classify as “organic” such products or processes as genetically modified seeds and the
uses of irradiation and sewage sludge, leading to the submission of over 275,603 comments,
almost all opposing these classifications—“more public comments than any other USDA
regulation in history”).
24. Id. at 384.
25. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (40th anniversary ed., Mariner Books 2002). Much
of Carson’s book originally appeared as a series of articles in the New Yorker. See
CHRISTOPHER J. BOSSO, PESTICIDES AND POLITICS 116–17 (1987) (describing the original
magazine articles).
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26
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). But
Carson argued for something more fundamental than a broader
accounting of the health and environmental effects of pesticides.
Carson concluded Silent Spring with a chapter entitled “The Other
Road,” in which she called on farmers and agricultural researchers to
eschew what she termed the “arrogance” of the “control of nature,”27
and instead to develop solutions to agricultural pests “based on
understanding of the living organisms they seek to control, and of the
whole fabric of life to which these organisms belong.”28 Unlike
regulatory reform based merely on quantifying and prioritizing risks,
the other road marked by the OFPA led toward a fundamentally
different form of agriculture. And unlike the artificially constructed
markets in pollution control established in the 1990 Clean Air Act
amendments, the OFPA sought to link this different form of
agriculture directly into the nation’s broader consumer markets. And
it succeeded. For all the attention given the artificial market for sulfur
dioxide allowances under the Clean Air Act, its annual market value
in 2004 was approximately $4 billion.29 In contrast, sales of organic
food in 2004 were approximately $15.4 billion, up from $12.9 billion in
30
2003. Organic foods have for years constituted the fastest growing
segment of the agricultural market.31 The OFPA marked a road that
has been taken.
After recounting briefly in Part I the basic contours of organic
agriculture and USDA’s development of the NOP, this Essay
squarely addresses in Part II the continuing challenge to the NOP’s
legitimacy. Specifically, this Essay responds to attacks—typically
framed in the language of risk assessment—that organic agriculture
cannot be squared with sound public policy or with what its attackers

26. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No.
88-305, 78 Stat. 190 (1964) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136y (2000)); see also
Hornstein, supra note 11, at 422–23, 426 (describing the influence Carson’s writings had on the
congressional revision of FIFRA in 1964).
27. CARSON, supra note 25, at 297.
28. Id. at 278.
29. CHICAGO CLIMATE FUTURES EXCH., THE SULFUR DIOXIDE EMISSION ALLOWANCE
TRADING PROGRAM: MARKET ARCHITECTURE, MARKET DYNAMICS AND PRICING 7 (2004),
available at http://www.ccfe.com/education_ccfe/SO2_Background_Drivers_Pricing_PDF.pdf
(valuing registered trades in 2004 at $4 billion and over-the-counter trades involving forward
and option contracts at an additional $1–2 billion).
30. William J. Friedman, The Framework for Global Organic Food Trade Circa 2005:
Accomplishments and Challenges, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 361, 365 (2005).
31. Id.
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frequently describe as sound science. The central thesis of this Essay
is that detractors of organic agriculture too often rest their claims to
sound science with arbitrarily narrow framing devices that mask the
full range of benefits that organic agriculture may offer. In that
regard, the battles over organic agriculture are not unique. In January
2006, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB)
sought to hardwire just such a limiting rubric across the entirety of the
regulatory landscape by proposing, in the name of sound science, a
national “risk assessment bulletin.”32 In December 2006, a panel of
the National Academy of Sciences, after conducting an eleven-month
peer review, took the unprecedented step of returning the proposal to
OMB as “unscientific” and “unjustified.”33 This Essay discusses how
the artificially limited perspectives of the rejected OMB proposal
reflect just the sort of arbitrary argumentation too often marshaled in
defense of conventional agriculture and against organic foods.
I. ORGANIC AGRICULTURE AND THE NATIONAL
ORGANIC PROGRAM
Organic agriculture can be understood on three levels, each one
of which can be helpful to policy and legal analyses. At its broadest
level, organic agriculture reflects a set of ethical positions—toward
the environment, toward socioeconomic justice, and toward animal
welfare—as well as a set of agricultural methods. The International
Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements speaks of four
overarching principles of organic agriculture—of health,34 ecology,35
fairness,36 and care37—and stresses their applicability “to agriculture in

32. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN (2006),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/proposed_risk_assessment_bulletin_
010906.pdf [hereinafter OMB BULLETIN].
33. COMM. TO REVIEW THE OMB RISK ASSESSMENT BULLETIN, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., SCIENTIFIC REVIEW OF THE PROPOSED RISK ASSESSMENT
BULLETIN FROM THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET (2007), available at
http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11811.html [hereinafter NAS REPORT].
34. Int’l Fed’n of Organic Agric. Movements, The Principles of Organic Agriculture,
http://www.ifoam.org/about_ifoam/principles/index.html (last visited May 10, 2007) (“Organic
Agriculture should sustain and enhance the health of soil, plant, animal, human and planet as
one and indivisible.”).
35. Id. (“Organic Agriculture should be based on living ecological systems and cycles, work
with them, emulate them and help sustain them.”).
36. Id. (“Organic Agriculture should build on relationships that ensure fairness with regard
to the common environment and life opportunities[.]”).
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the broadest sense, including the way people tend soils, water, plants
and animals” and to the way people “relate to one another and shape
38
the legacy of future generations.” It is not hard to catch in such
meta-principles the philosophical, as well as technical, aspects of the
“other road” that Rachel Carson propounded. And, while still
describing organic agriculture at this broadest level, it bears mention
that organic agriculture also has social and organizational
dimensionality; there are hundreds of regional and local organic
industry trade groups, each often having slightly varying standards.39
Moreover, at the international level, in addition to the standards set
by the private International Federation of Organic Agriculture
Movements, there are also standards for organic food products set by
the Codex Alimentarius Commission, an entity operating under the
United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization and the World
Health Organization.40 Thus, broadly speaking, organic agriculture
has all the earmarks of a self-generating, self-policing private
organization centered on core norms that might simultaneously
deliver both private goods and public beneficial externalities.41
37. Id. (“Organic Agriculture should be managed in a precautionary and responsible
manner to protect the health and well-being of current and future generations and the
environment.”).
38. Id.
39. See Friedman, supra note 30, at 362 (“A single database with copies of all of the known
organic production and processing standards would be immense and not unlike having a set of
all local zoning regulations or building codes. This is because the organic market is confronted
with hundreds of private sector standards and governmental regulations . . . .”).
40. On the organization of the Codex Alimentarius Commission, see Cindy Joffe Hyman,
Comment, Food for Thought: Defending the Organic Foods Production Act of 1990 Against
Claims of Protectionism, 14 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 1719, 1723 (2000). On the Codex’s specific
organic standards, see Lawrence Speer, Food Safety: International Food Organization Sets Out
Guidelines for Organically Produced Foods, INT’L TRADE DAILY (BNA), July 2, 1999, at D7. In
general, the Codex offers the following definition of organic agriculture:
“Organic” is a labeling term that denotes products that have been produced in
accordance with organic production standards and certified by a duly constituted
certification body or authority. Organic agriculture is based on . . . avoiding the use of
synthetic fertilizers and pesticides. . . . The primary goal of organic agriculture is to
optimize the health and productivity of interdependent communities of soil life,
plants, animals and people.
Friedman, supra note 30, at 363 (quoting Guidelines for the Production, Processing, Labelling
and Marketing of Organically Produced Foods, in JOINT FAO/WHO FOOD STANDARDS
PROGRAMME, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION 9 (July 2005), available at
http://www.codexalimentarius.net/download/standards/360/CXG_032e.pdf).
41. Of the potential value of groups motivated by social norms generally, see Richard H.
McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 356
(1997) (explaining how private individuals might follow beneficial social norms from which they
derive individual esteem). Of the social value, if not necessity, for further gains in
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At a second, narrower level, organic agriculture can be
understood as one of several “alternative” agricultural systems. All of
these systems share the goal of reducing, if not eliminating, reliance
on such chemical or artificial agricultural inputs as conventional
pesticides and fertilizers. There are roughly four alternative methods
most often suggested as substitutes. First, there are cultural methods
of disease, weed, and pest control, such as crop rotations and
staggered planting dates.42 Second, there are biological control
methods, such as the release of “beneficial” predatory or parasitic
43
insects that can attack pests. Third, there are “biorational” pest
control measures such as pheromone-baited traps.44 And fourth—
although not an option embraced by organic agriculturalists—there is
“integrated pest management,” (IPM) a “decisionmaking system
designed to use all ‘suitable’ pest control techniques, including
chemical pesticides, to keep pest populations below economically
injurious levels while satisfying environmental and production
objectives.”45 The National Academy of Sciences spoke of alternative
agriculture generally when it concluded in 1989 that “[w]ider
adoption of proven alternative systems would result in even greater
economic benefits to farmers and environmental gains for the
nation.”46
Finally, there is the legal regime governing organic agriculture
developed under the Organic Foods Production Act. In the late
1980s, against the backdrop of legislation in over twenty states
regulating organic food labeling in different ways,47 the organic food
industry petitioned Congress for legislation that would create a set of
48
national standards for organic products. The OFPA, from the point
of view of regulatory design and administrative law, was strikingly
innovative. At the same time that alternatives to traditional
environmental protection of encouraging the self-referential value of nonlegal social
institutions, see Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1231–32
(1995) (suggesting possibilities of gains from non-state-centered solutions).
42. Hornstein, supra note 11, at 401 (citing Brian P. Baker, Pest Control in the Public
Interest: Crop Protection in California, 8 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 31, 33 (1988)).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 401 n.174 (explaining that pheromone-baited traps emit chemical scents that draw
pest insects into devices from which they cannot emerge).
45. Id. at 401.
46. ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at 6.
47. Friedland, supra note 23, at 382.
48. JEAN M. RAWSON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ORGANIC AGRICULTURE IN THE
UNITED STATES: PROGRAM AND POLICY ISSUES 3 (2006).
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command-and-control regulation such as risk-based decisionmaking
and market-like incentives were drawing so much attention, the
OFPA created a system that could tie public environmental and
ethical values into existing, real markets; that informed the
development of governmental organic standards with input from a
National Organic Standards Board composed of nongovernmental
representatives from different facets of the organic industry; and that
centered regulatory compliance on a system of approved privatesector certification rather than a large federal bureaucracy.
The OFPA is a marketing-oriented statute designed to regularize
what was at the time a potentially confusing Babel of competing
standards with an official federal “organic” label.49 Not only was a
federal label thought useful in promoting consumer confidence in the
growing organic industry within the United States,50 but it was also
viewed as helpful in facilitating trade in “a potentially lucrative
51
international organic market.” For this reason, the OFPA’s primary
administrative delegation to develop the National Organic Program
52
was to the USDA’s Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS). But
because the AMS had little direct experience with organic agriculture,
its decisions were to be informed by recommendations from organic
industry representatives serving on the National Organic Standards
Board (NOSB).53 Although USDA was slow even to propose
establishment of the NOP,54 by 2002 final rules had been implemented
that allowed, among other things, qualifying products to use the
official USDA “organic” label in conjunction with terms such as “100
percent organic” or “organic.”55
49. Id. at 3 (“The industry maintained that federal standards would reduce consumer
confusion over the many different state and private standards then in use, and would promote
confidence in the integrity of organic products over the long term.”).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.; see also Friedman, supra note 30, at 366 (noting that implementation of the
National Organic Program was located within the AMS “because it is considered a marketing
program”).
53. See RAWSON, supra note 48, at 3–4 (“The [A]ct established a 15-member National
Organic Standards Board (NOSB) to ‘assist in the development of standards for substances to
be used in organic production . . . and to provide recommendations to the Secretary regarding
implementation.’”).
54. AMS’s first proposed rule to establish the NOP was not issued until December 1997,
some seven years after passage of the OFPA. See National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg.
65,850 (proposed Dec. 16, 1997).
55. See 7 C.F.R. § 205.100(a) (2007) (referring to regulatory requirements needed);
National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548, 80,550 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt.
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By two measures, the NOP has been successful. First, in its
definition of organic farming, even a business-oriented institution like
the AMS recognized that, broadly speaking, organic agriculture was
more than simply the application of certain techniques. True to the
movement’s overarching principles, organic farming was defined
under the OFPA as “[a] production system that is managed in
accordance with [OFPA regulations] to respond to site-specific
conditions by integrating cultural, biological, and mechanical
practices that foster cycling of resources, promote ecological balance,
56
and conserve biodiversity.” But second, and as importantly, the
national system of organic certification has contributed to the
underlying growth of the organic food market, both domestically and
internationally. The Congressional Research Service reported in 2006
(based on 2004 data) that over 11,000 certified organic crop, livestock,
and handling operations were involved with over 2 million acres of
certified organic cropland and pasture/rangeland in a domestic
market that maintained an astonishing annual rate of growth of 20
percent beginning in 1990.57 By one account, the domestic sale of
organic foods might exceed $23 billion by 2010, or 3.5 percent of total
U.S. retail sales (up from $10.4 billion in sales in 2003, accounting
then for only 2 percent of total U.S. sales).58 Internationally, as of
2005 organic food production is reported to occur in 110 countries, on
59
over 558,000 farms cultivating over 64 million acres, with global sales
maintaining an annual expansion rate of 7–9 percent and having
60
already exceeded a total of $25 billion. Following the United States’
lead in 1990, both Europe and Japan similarly adopted national
standards for organic products.61 To the extent the OFPA was

205). Generally, the term “organic” may be used for products containing at least 95 percent
organic materials, whereas the term “100% organic” is reserved for products containing 100
percent organically produced materials. See Claire S. Carroll, Comment, What Does Organic
Mean Now? Chickens and Wild Fish Are Undermining the Organic Foods Production Act of
1990, 14 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 117, 128–29 (2004).
56. 7 C.F.R. § 205.2 (2007). See RAWSON, supra note 48, at 1 (“This definition indicates
that organic agriculture is both an approach to food production . . . . and a broadly defined
philosophical approach to farming that puts value on resource efficiency and ecological
harmony.”).
57. RAWSON, supra note 48, at 1–2.
58. Id. (citing an estimate from a business journal).
59. Friedman, supra note 30, at 364–65.
60. Id. at 365.
61. See, e.g., id. at 361 (citing Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2092/91 of June 24, 1991 on
Organic Production of Agricultural Products and Indications Referring Thereto on Agricultural
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premised on the contribution national standards might make to
62
market growth, the NOP has been successful.
But there have also been signs that USDA implementation of the
NOP has misunderstood the full sweep of organic agriculture’s
principles. The clearest sign occurred in 1997 when the NOP was first
proposed. Then, the USDA had included the use of genetically
63
modified organisms among its range of acceptable “organic”
practices over the strong objection of the NOSB.64 The USDA’s
reasons for doing so were defensive rather than descriptive. The
agency pointed to no evidence that organic farmers actually used
genetically modified organisms, or that such use would be consistent
with the broader principles of organic agriculture, or even that an
independent scientific inquiry had led the agency to believe that
Products and Foodstuffs, 1991 O.J. (L 198), 22.7, 1 (on European standards) and Japanese
Agric. Standards of Organic Agric. Prods., Ministry of Agric., Forestry and Fisheries
Notification No. 59 of 2000, available at http://www.maff.go.jp [in Japanese] (last visited May 10,
2007) (on Japanese standards)).
62. Certainly, however, there is still work to be done, especially as to the coordination of
different international standards. In 2002, Japan became the first—and so far, the only—country
to accept USDA certification for importation of organic goods. See U.S. Dep’t Agric., Japan
Accepts U.S. Organic Standards for Some Food Exports (Mar. 27, 2002), http://usinfo.org/wfarchive/2002/020328/epf409.htm (last visited May 10, 2007); U.S. DEP’T AGRIC., USDA
MARKET PROFILE FOR ORGANIC FOOD PRODUCTS 10 (2005), available at http://www.fas.usda.
gov/agx/organics/USMarketProfileOrganicFoodFeb2005.pdf.
63. See Zeichner, supra note 20, at 474. Also included in the proposed rule was the use of
sewage sludge and irradiation. Id. As a note on terminology, the phrase “genetically modified
organism” (GMO) is sometimes criticized as overbroad, as it could include any agricultural
practice (such as traditional cross breeding) that seeks to give a plant or animal a new
combination of heritable traits, as opposed to the more precise objection to doing so via the
transfer of altered DNA or via the transfer of one species’ DNA into the cells of another
species. See Friedland, supra note 23, at 387. Such critics prefer terms such as “biotechnology”
or “bioengineering” to capture the distinction. Id. In the regulatory history of the NOP,
however (not to mention the broader social debates surrounding these techniques), the terms
“genetically modified organism,” “genetic modification,” or “GMOs” are used so frequently to
capture the meaning of biotechnology that my use of those phrases throughout this Essay is
unlikely to cause any confusion—and has the historical virtue of using the same terms as were
used by participants in the development of the NOP. Moreover, the NOSB, in its biotechnology
policy, preserves much of this distinction when its states, “[g]enetically engineered is defined as:
Made with techniques that alter the molecular or cell biology of an organism by means that are
not possible under natural conditions or processes . . . and shall not include breeding,
conjugation, fermentation, hybridization, in-vitro fertilization, and tissue culture.” Nat’l Organic
Standards Bd., Biotechnology Policy—1996, http://www.ams.usda.gov/nosb/archives/biotech/
policy.html.
64. Regarding the incompatibility of genetically modified organisms and organic
agriculture, the National Organic Standards Board had recommended in 1996 “that the class of
genetically engineered organisms and their derivatives be prohibited in organic production and
handling systems.” Nat’l Organic Standards Bd., supra note 63.
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genetically modified products were either beneficial or free of
dangers. Rather the agency principally explained that, because the
United States was otherwise the leading advocate for genetically
modified agricultural products, it was concerned that excluding the
use of genetic engineering from the NOP would cause its foreign
trading partners to believe that the federal government was
concerned with the safety of food grown with some use of genetic
engineering.65 The public response to the proposed rule is legendary.
By one account, public opposition was so enormous—“it was one of
the largest [public responses] in the history of the federal
government”66—that USDA was twice required to extend the
comment period to accommodate the sheer number of critical written
67
submissions. By another, more than 275,000 comments, almost all
opposing USDA’s proposed rule, were received.68 In the end, USDA
retracted the proposal and the final NOP prohibited the use of
69
genetic engineering as an approved practice. In doing so, the agency
stated that the OFPA was primarily a marketing statute and that as
the public overwhelmingly views “organic” foods not to have been
grown with genetic modification techniques, excluding them was
necessary to preserve the meaningfulness of the USDA’s “organic”
label.70
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the USDA’s final
position was unquestionably consistent with the OFPA. But within
USDA’s explanation lie shades of a less defensible conclusion: that
organic agriculture, including the non-utilization of genetically
modified processes, gains its legitimacy only within the realm of
public perception and could not survive the scrutiny of full-fledged
scientific inquiry. The American Crop Protection Association, an
organization that supports the use of genetic modification in farming,
came close to stating this explicitly: “The [ACPA] can accept the
exclusion of modern biotechnology from organic production as an
‘excluded method’ only with the clear understanding that the organic

65. Zeichner, supra note 20, at 474–76.
66. Carroll, supra note 55, at 127.
67. Id.
68. See Zeichner, supra note 20, at 475.
69. National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 7 C.F.R. pt.
205).
70. See, e.g., id. at 80,549 (“A variety of methods [is] used to genetically modify organisms
or influence their growth and development by means that are not possible under natural
conditions or processes and are not considered compatible with organic production.”).
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designation is in no way an indication of safety or quality but is rather
71
a marketing standard.” In the remainder of this Essay, I address this
inference.
II. FRAMING THE SCIENTIFIC INQUIRY OVER CONVENTIONAL AND
ORGANIC AGRICULTURE
Criticism of nonconventional agriculture is often quite blunt. In
1978, at congressional hearings on pesticide reform legislation, one
proponent of conventional agriculture framed the debate in the
starkest of terms: “[Without pesticides, o]ur concern will not be that
of a silent spring, but a silent summer, silent autumn, silent winter and
a silent world. Silence will be broken only by those crying for food.
The name of that game is famine!”72 Twenty-five years later, shortly
after USDA adopted the National Organic Program, the science
correspondent for Reason magazine addressed the merits of organic
agriculture in similarly bleak terms: “[t]he greatest catastrophe that
the human race could face this century is not global warming but a
global conversion to ‘organic farming’—an estimated 2 billion people
would perish.”73
Yet what is interesting in the debate between conventional and
nonconventional agriculture is how often one can see the influence of
framing devices—rather than comprehensive risk-cost-benefit
analyses—on the conclusions reached. To be sure, it is hardly clear
that a full comparative analysis is desirable or even possible. In part,
this is because such an analysis would implicate philosophical and
political aspects of agriculture for which there are not agreed-upon
goals or metrics such as the optimal socioeconomic structure of
farming communities and the extent to which animal welfare should
matter. Moreover, a full analysis even about such measurable outputs
as long-term crop yield, effects on farm soils, energy use, and

71. See American Crop Protection Association comment on Docket No. TMD-00-02-PR2,
RIN 0581-AA40, National Organic Program, 62 Fed. Reg. 65,890 (Dec. 16, 1997).
72. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on
Agric., 94th Cong. 134 (1977) (statement of Arthur Bassett, Secretary, Onondaga County [New
York] Pest Control Association); see also Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
Extension: Hearing on H.R. 8841 Before the H. Comm. on Agric., 94th Cong. 129 (1976)
(remarks of Rep. Poage) (“Now if we are to go back to the ecology [without pesticides] as it
existed when Columbus discovered this country, then everyone [sic] of us is going to starve in 3
weeks.”).
73. Ronald Bailey, Organic Alchemy, REASONONLINE, June 5, 2002, http://www.reason.
com/news/show/34820.html (quoting Cambridge University chemist John Emsley).
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environmental externalities would be difficult in light of data that are
incomplete, uncertain, and contested.
But in this part of the Essay nothing as heroic as a full policy
analysis of agricultural systems is necessary. Rather, to rebut the
strident claims typically made against organic agriculture only two
points need be made. First, claims against organic agriculture have in
the past often relied on artificially constructed risk assessments that
frame conventional agriculture in a manner that may not be justified
on the merits. And second, once one begins to adjust the relevant
frames of inquiry, organic agriculture can make a sufficient showing
on the merits—akin to fulfilling a burden of coming forward—to
warrant support as a policy matter and not simply as a marketing
regime.
A. Framing Risk Assessments of Synthetic Pesticides
As a starting point, pesticides—and modern conventional
agriculture generally—certainly deserve credit for improving
agricultural output. Estimates of increased productivity indicate a 400
74
percent rate of return in the aggregate on the pesticide dollar. Yet
each particular type of pesticide carries within its application a form
of self-limitation: the tendency of the pesticide to induce genetic
resistance in future populations of the target pest and the destruction
of beneficial organisms that had previously kept target populations in
check.75 Thus, shortly before the OFPA was passed in the late 1980s
the country lost roughly the same percentage of its crops to pests as it
did in 1900, despite the application in 1987 of some 430 million
pounds of pesticides.76 Although this does not mean that pesticides in
the aggregate are not beneficial—as new pesticides are developed to
counteract resistant pests—it also does not necessarily mean that
pesticides are necessary. At the time of the OFPA’s passage, there

74. See David Pimentel et al., Benefits and Costs of Pesticide Use in U.S. Food Production,
28 BIOSCI. 772, 781 (1978), cited in Hornstein, supra note 11, at 393.
75. Between 1938 and 1984, the number of pesticide-resistant insects and mites grew from
seven species to four hundred and forty seven “and included most of the world’s pests.” Sandra
Postel, Controlling Toxic Chemicals, in STATE OF THE WORLD 1988, at 22 (Linda Stark ed.,
1988) (citing George P. Georghiou, The Magnitude of the Resistance Problem, in NAT’L
RESEARCH COUNCIL, PESTICIDE RESISTANCE: STRATEGIES AND TACTICS FOR MANAGEMENT
(1986)). By 1999, almost 1,000 agricultural pests were immune to common pesticides. See
LESTER R. BROWN ET AL., VITAL SIGNS 1999, at 124 (1999).
76. Postel, supra note 75, at 122 (“Insects and weeds now reduce crop production by about
30 percent, apparently no less than before the chemical age dawned.”).
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were data showing that pesticide use could be cut in half on some
crops without significant reductions in yields or significant increases
77
in price. Thus, in determining whether organic agriculture has
something to offer as a public policy matter, one must credit
conventional agricultural pesticides with benefits but perhaps not the
extreme benefits often claimed by their most ardent defenders.
This, then, puts the focus on pesticides’ risks and highlights the
role that framing can have on our appreciation of these risks. Many of
the debates over agriculture focus on the extent to which there are
health risks to consumers from pesticide residues.78 And, although I
discuss the effects of framing on this debate, it bears emphasis that
the focus on health effects itself is not necessarily the dominant frame
of reference by which the risks of pesticides (or the corresponding
benefits or organic agriculture) ought to be resolved. Not only are
many purchasers of organic products concerned about the adverse
effects on the environment of conventional agriculture (as opposed to
health effects),79 but the severe environmental effects of agriculture in
80
general are increasingly drawing the attention of commenters.

77. See JENNIFER CURTIS ET AL., HARVEST OF HOPE: THE POTENTIAL FOR
ALTERNATIVE AGRICULTURE TO REDUCE PESTICIDE USE 4 (1991) (“A new study by Cornell
University Entomologist, David Pimentel, estimates that if 50 percent of pesticides now used in
American agriculture were replaced by nonchemical control techniques, crop yields would not
decline and food prices would rise less than one percent.”) (citing David Pimentel et al.,
Environmental and Economic Impacts of Reducing U.S. Agricultural Pesticide Use, in
HANDBOOK OF PEST MANAGEMENT IN AGRICULTURE (1991)); see also ALTERNATIVE
AGRICULTURE, supra note 16, at 209–12 (the use of integrated pest management for insects on
nine crops in ten states shows better yield for IPM users over nonusers).
78. See Barbara J. Goldman & Kathryn L. Clancy, A Survey of Organic Produce
Purchasers and Related Attitudes of Food Cooperative Shoppers, 6 AM. J. ALTERNATIVE
AGRIC. 89, 95 (1991) (measuring a high level of concern over pesticide residues on produce
among those who seek out and purchase organic products), cited in Friedland, supra note 23, at
410 n.154; see also Dennis T. Avery & Alex A. Avery, ‘Negative Campaigning’ for the New U.S.
Organic Food Standards, Hudson Institute, Center for Global Food Issues, Oct. 2002,
http://www.cgfi.org/materials/articles/2002/oct_18_02.htm (rebutting health claims made by
advocates for organic food in part by noting that allowable pesticide residue amounts “are
1/100th or 1/1000th of the ‘no-effect’ level in animal tests”); Richard A. Halpern, Dirty Pool,
Hudson Institute, Center for Global Food Issues, Feb. 2000, http://www.cgfi.org/materials/
articles/2000/feb_23_00.htm (“Monsanto’s Roundup, for example, probably the most widely
used herbicide in history, is half as toxic as table salt or Vitamin A and hundreds of times less
toxic than caffeine.”).
79. See Friedland, supra note 23, at 407–08 (“Many consumers are motivated to buy
organic food at least in part because they think organic farming is less harmful to the
environment than conventional farming.”).
80. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Agriculture and the Environment: Introduction to the
Conference Issue, 25 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 47, 49 (2002) (“Disputes involving
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Although organic agriculture can contribute to some environmental
problems, its reduction in synthetic pesticide use can constitute an
enormous public benefit.81 J.B. Ruhl documents the “undeniable”
82
83
adverse environmental effects of pesticides on surface waters,
84
85
86
ground water, endangered species, and air pollution. Even in 1990,
when the OFPA was enacted as a “marketing” program, EPA’s
Science Advisory Board was elsewhere concluding that, “when
compared with dozens of other risks, pesticides presented one of the
country’s more widespread and severe environmental problems.”87
Assuming the premise, however, that the risks of pesticides are
to be measured principally by the health effects of pesticide residues
on consumers, the conclusions reached can reflect the risk assessor’s
frame of reference and not necessarily the underlying reality. This
was perhaps best illustrated in the years following passage of the
OFPA when evidence began to mount that pesticides may be more
dangerous to infants and children than previously thought. In 1993,
the National Academy of Sciences published the results of a five-year
inquiry, Pesticides in the Diets of Infants and Children.88 Among its
major findings were that risk assessments of pesticides were typically
based only on the “average exposure of the entire population,”89 and

agriculture and the environment have been frequent and varied over the last several years.”);
J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263,
269–70 (2000) (“But the reality is that farming, particularly in the modern American style, is an
intensive land use involving a multitude of polluting and land transforming activities.”).
81. The NOP does allow certain nonsynthetic “natural” pesticides to be included on a
“National List” of approved substances that can be used in organic food production (and in
some instances even such non-organic substances as pectin and cornstarch). See RAWSON, supra
note 48, at 3–4, 11.
82. Ruhl, supra note 80, at 282 (“Although pesticides have undoubtedly improved
agricultural efficiency . . . their adverse environmental impacts are also undeniable.”).
83. Id. at 276–77, 283.
84. Id. at 283 n.107 (“In 1992, the EPA reported that 132 pesticide-related compounds, 117
parent pesticides, and 16 pesticide degradates had been found in ground water in 42 states.”).
85. Id. at 277 & n.51; see also Hornstein, supra note 11, at 395 n.142 (“[A]dverse effects on
wildlife have forced North Dakota to prohibit applications of 37 different kinds of pesticides
under its endangered species program.”).
86. Ruhl, supra note 80, at 292 (“In California, two weeks of ambient air monitoring near
sugar beet and potato fields for the carcinogen fumigant Telone II measured ambient air levels
that exceeded the safe level for chronic inhalation exposures . . . .”).
87. See Hornstein, supra note 11, at 394 & n.130.
88. COMM. ON PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN, NAT’L RESEARCH
COUNCIL, PESTICIDES IN THE DIETS OF INFANTS AND CHILDREN (1993) [hereinafter INFANTS
AND CHILDREN].
89. Id. at 2.
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failed to recognize that infants and children had different (typically
far higher) exposure levels and, as importantly, that pesticides can
cause different (and sometimes more adverse) health effects in the
90
developing body than they do in adults. Armed with these new
insights, Congress passed the Food Quality Protection Act of 1996
(Food Protection Act)91 designed to establish administrative
mechanisms that reevaluated the safety of pesticides specifically in
92
light of the National Academy’s report.
To appreciate the battles over risk assessments that followed the
Food Protection Act, it is helpful to understand the basic mechanisms
by which EPA, prior to the Act, would determine the safety of
pesticide residues on food. Under the Federal Food, Drug, and
93
Cosmetic Act (FFDCA), EPA would establish “tolerances” for
residues on raw agriculture commodities such as fresh produce under
94
FFDCA section 408. Generally, these tolerances reflected a level of
pesticide residue on food that EPA first determined to be
“reasonably safe for an adult” often based on animal testing results
and then, second, a discounting of this level by a factor of 100—a tenfold reduction to account for the uncertainties in scaling from animal
tests to effects on humans and another ten-fold reduction to account
for normal human variations in susceptibility to toxins.95 Prior to the
Food Protection Act, however, EPA set tolerances “without regard to
the special susceptibilities of children to pesticides.”96 Yet in its 1993
Report, the National Academy of Sciences found that in their
potential susceptibility to pesticides, “[p]rofound differences exist
between children and adults” such that “the toxicity of pesticides is
97
frequently different” between them. The Report suggested that,
given the lack of basic data on “the effects of pesticide exposure on

90. Id. at 4–6 (exposure), 3 (age-related differences in children’s absorption, metabolism,
detoxification, and excretion abilities as compared to adults).
91. Food Quality Protection Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-170, 110 Stat. 1489 (1996)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.).
92. See H.R. REP. NO. 104-669(II), at 43 (1990), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1268, 1282
(House Commerce Committee’s Report on the Food Protection Act, citing the 1993 National
Academy report).
93. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–393 (2000).
94. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 342, 346a(a)(1)(A) (2000).
95. See Valerie Watnick, Risk Assessment: Obfuscation of Policy Decisions in Pesticide
Regulation and the EPA’s Dismantling of the Food Quality Protection Act’s Safeguards for
Children, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1315, 1318–19 (1999).
96. Id. at 1318.
97. INFANTS AND CHILDREN, supra note 88, at 3.
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neurotoxic, immunotoxic, [and] endocrine responses in infants and
98
children,” and that when toxicity testing in relation to children
reveals certain fetal development effects or testing in relation to postfetal development is “incomplete,” an additional ten-fold reduction in
pesticide tolerances should be used.99
The Food Protection Act codified many of the National
Academy’s recommendations. In particular, it required EPA to set
tolerances that considered the special susceptibility of infants and
children to pesticides; that considered the higher levels of
consumption by children of fruits, vegetables and other products; that
accounted for the “cumulative” effects of exposures to other
chemicals (pesticides or not) that shared a common mechanism of
toxicity with the suspect pesticide; and that considered the
“aggregate” amount of the pesticide to which an individual might also
be exposed (such as amounts of the same pesticide that might be
found in tapwater or that might be found in household and garden
100
products). The Act specifically directed EPA to apply an additional
“tenfold margin of safety” to account for the special susceptibility of
infants and children, allowing the use of a different margin of safety
“only if, on the basis of reliable data, such margin will be safe for
101
infants and children.” At bottom, EPA was to readjust its approach
to pesticides and to issue tolerances for new pesticides, as well as to
reanalyze tolerances for all existing pesticides, such that “there is a
reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate exposure
to the pesticide chemical residue, including all anticipated dietary
exposures and all other exposures for which there is reliable
information.”102 To help with the enormous scientific task with which
EPA had been charged—reassessing over 9,000 then-existing
tolerances—the Act allowed EPA to approach the problem in stages:
to reassess one-third of these tolerances by August 1999, the next
third by August 2002, and the final third by August 2006.103

98. Id. at 4.
99. Id. at 9.
100. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C), (D) (2000). See generally Thomas O. McGarity,
Politics by Other Means: Law, Science, and Policy in EPA’s Implementation of the Food Quality
Protection Act, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 118–19 (2001) (elaborating on the statutory
requirements).
101. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(C) (2000); see also McGarity, supra note 100, at 118.
102. 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000).
103. See CONSUMERS UNION OF THE U.S., A REPORT CARD FOR THE EPA: SUCCESSES
AND FAILURES IN IMPLEMENTING THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT, Overview, at 2
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It is precisely from these new, science-based reference points
required by the Food Protection Act that one can begin to appreciate
why organic agriculture may offer health-based, and not simply
“market-based,” benefits. Several years after the Act’s passage, and
after EPA had completed its reassessment of the first third of
tolerances, both the U.S. General Accounting Office104 and the
105
Consumers Union of the United States reported on EPA’s newfound conclusions regarding pesticide safety. Both reports noted that
EPA had targeted especially the classes of organophosphate and
carbamate insecticides because they were widely used on fruits and
vegetables consumed by children106 and because they operated as
neurotoxins to which infants and children with developing nervous
107
systems might be especially vulnerable. Of 44 organophosphates
registered for use in the United States, EPA tightened the chronic
exposure limit in 20 cases, or 45 percent.108 For most of these
pesticides, moreover, it was expected that further data on aggregate
and cumulative exposure might cause even further tolerance
reductions.109 After considering in June 2000 just such additional data
on chlorpyrifos, the most widely used household insecticide in the
United States, EPA announced “a need to substantially reduce

(2001), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/pdf/fqpa/ReportCard_final.pdf [hereinafter
CONSUMERS UNION REPORT].
104. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CHILDREN AND PESTICIDES: NEW APPROACH TO
CONSIDERING RISK IS PARTLY IN PLACE (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/archive/
2000/he00175.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
105. See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103.
106. See, e.g., id., pt. 2, at 2 (“Early in its FQPA implementation planning, EPA determined
that the organophosphate (OP) and carbamate insecticides (two families of acutely neurotoxic
chemicals, many of which are widely used on fruits and vegetables popular in children’s diets)
should be top priorities.”); GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 8 (“EPA has identified the
organophosphates as a class of pesticides requiring cumulative assessment because they can
impair nervous system function by inhibiting the enzyme cholinesterase.”).
107. See GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 8; CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103,
pt. 3, at 1.
108. See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103, pt. 2, at 4–5. EPA’s conclusions as to
these pesticides’ risks were interim in nature because cumulative data on exposure to this
chemical class were not considered in this first wave, and they were expected to become even
more unforgiving when cumulative data became available. See GAO REPORT, supra note 104,
at 4 (“EPA has not completed aggregate exposure reviews for all 39 organophosphates
individually, but when it does, a cumulative assessment will be required for the group, which
may identify the need for additional changes.”).
109. See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103, pt. 2, at 4.
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children’s exposure to this pesticide by reducing its use on foods
110
frequently eaten by children . . . .”
The contrast between this reassessment of pesticide safety, on
the one hand, and implementation of the Organic Food Production
Act, on the other, is striking. Just as reports on EPA’s first wave of
reanalyses of pesticide tolerances were being reported, the USDA
was announcing and implementing the “organic” label provisions of
111
the National Organic Act. Whatever would emerge as the final
picture of pesticides’ dangers to children and infants, there are data
indicating that eating organic foods reduces those risks. In 2001, in a
study reported in Environmental Health Perspectives (the journal of
the National Institute of Environmental Health Science), a survey of
pesticide exposure among 110 urban and suburban children in the
Seattle area found what was then considered a surprising result—
measurable levels of organophosphate pesticide metabolites were
found in the urine of all children, “except for one child, whose parents
reported buying exclusively organic produce.”112 To confirm the
implications of this result, a more comprehensive study among young
children in the Seattle area was conducted, complete with a carefully
designed control group, which reached similar results: “eating organic
produce can markedly lower children’s exposures (to
organophosphates) from possibly above the EPA’s current safety

110. GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 4. To be sure, EPA did not tighten the limits for most
of the tolerances considered in this first wave of reassessment. EPA eliminated or cancelled
nearly half of the 3,471 tolerances “counted as reassessed” in the first wave without even
considering the new children-centered risk assessments in the Food Protection Act. Id. at 19.
Some of these voluntary cancellations reflected manufacturers simply agreeing to eliminate
tolerances for products that had been withdrawn from various uses in the past. Id. In other
cases, manufacturers claimed that they were agreeing to withdrawal of tolerances due to
“market conditions.” Id. As to this latter group, however, the GAO reported that “[a]n EPA
official told us that in a number of these cases, risk concerns that the agency expressed about the
associated pesticide contributed to the manufacturer’s decision to drop the tolerance.” Id. As to
those pesticides that did consider the new regulatory requirements of the Food Protection Act,
most of those tolerances, 77.5 percent, resulted in no change. Id. However, as I note infra in the
text accompanying notes 115–25, some of these decisions generated considerable controversy.
111. See National Organic Program, 65 Fed. Reg. 80,548 (Dec. 21, 2000) (codified at 7
C.F.R. pt. 205).
112. ORGANIC CTR., SUCCESSES AND LOST OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE CHILDREN’S
EXPOSURE TO PESTICIDES SINCE THE MID-1990S, at 6 (2006) [hereinafter ORGANIC CTR.]
(referencing Chensheng Lu et al., Biological Monitoring Survey of Organophosphate Pesticide
Exposure among Preschool Children in the Seattle Metropolitan Area, 109 ENVTL. HEALTH
PERSPECT. 299–303 (2001)).
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113
guidelines, to negligible risk levels.” Even more recently, a third
study, and the first to introduce longitudinal analysis, found that
children switching from conventional to organic diets saw two
organophosphate pesticide concentrations drop to nondetectable
levels until the reintroduction of a diet using food grown
conventionally.114 Although the quantifiable health benefits of eating
organic produce would depend on many factors, including any
negative factors stemming from the higher price of organic food, for
the purposes of this analysis a final accounting need not be made. All
that is necessary is that health benefits are not improbable. And
further insights from EPA’s implementation of the Food Protection
Act only contribute to that conclusion.

B. Organic Agriculture as Insurance Against Politicized Agency
Decisions
It is possible that EPA’s reassessment of pesticide risks, despite
the Agency’s early warnings on organophosphates, was actually even
more generous toward pesticides than was—and may still be—
justified by the available science. One reason for this may be the
political pressure exerted on EPA. To the extent this is true, then
purchasers of organic food are in fact making a second type of
purchase. The premium they pay in price also includes a type of
insurance payment made against the prospect that food grown
conventionally contains risks that, for political reasons, escape EPA
action.
Evidence of political pressure on EPA became evident as EPA
went about implementing the Food Protection Act. The scientific
flashpoint involved Congress’s specific concern, drawn from the
National Academy report on infants and children, that pesticides
could present special neurological and developmental risks to
growing fetuses and children.115 The legal flashpoint was caught in
Congress’s decision to require EPA to apply an extra ten-fold margin
of safety to a pesticide’s tolerance (the 10-X factor) unless “on the

113. Id. at 6 (referencing Cynthia L. Curl et al., Organophosphorous Pesticide Exposure of
Urban and Suburban Preschool Children with Organic and Conventional Diets, 111 ENVTL.
HEALTH PERSPECT. 377 (2003)).
114. See Chensheng Lu et al., Organic Diets Significantly Lower Children’s Dietary
Exposure to Organophosphorous Pesticides, 114 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSPECT. 260, 260–63
(2006).
115. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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basis of reliable data” a different margin of safety would lead, after
consideration of “all anticipated dietary exposures and all other
exposures for which there is reliable information,” to the conclusion
of “reasonable certainty that no harm will result from aggregate
116
exposure.” And the regulatory flashpoints were EPA’s decisions on
the types of neurological/developmental data to require and on the
type of data gap that would justify a departure from the default 10-X
factor.
In 1998, as the Agency was developing policies on reassessing the
first third of tolerances, a political firefight erupted over application
of the 10-X factor. A memorandum from EPA Administrator Carol
Browner on February 25 suggested one of the Agency’s judgments on
how to proceed: “[w]here there is uncertainty about the need for
additional studies to address child-specific concerns, then that
uncertainty itself should mandate application of an additional safety
117
factor.” Almost immediately, a representative of the American
Crop Protection Association (ACPA) complained publicly that
118
Browner’s position represented “political mischief” that abandoned
119
“sound science” and that “could result in the loss of 90 percent of
organophosphate uses allowed on food.”120 Within the ensuing weeks,
then-Vice President Al Gore issued a directive to EPA to “follow
congressional intent in applying extra protection for children,” but to
apply “sound science,” and to create an administrative process that
would allow “interested parties” to provide feedback on agency
implementation.121 Thereafter, a lobbying effort to “bring reason” to
EPA’s implementation of the Food Protection Act was announced by
the ACPA that sought to generate five million “postcards or letters
sent to the president, members of Congress, and senior [EPA]
officials.”122 Spokesmen for the ACPA and for a large pesticide
registrant emphasized, respectively, that “science should drive public

116. See supra text accompanying note 102.
117. Bert McMeen, Pesticides: Agency Stance on Children’s Protections under FQPA
Criticized by Industry Official, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Mar. 4, 1998.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See Bert McMeen, Pesticides: Advisory Group Planned on FQPA in Response to
Directive from Gore, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Apr. 13, 1998.
122. See APCA Launches Letter-Writing Campaign Urging Rational Implementation of
FQPA, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Apr. 24, 1998.
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123
policy,” and that missteps by EPA could result in “decreased food
quality and increased numbers of insect parts in food [and] rises in
insect-borne diseases, such as encephalitis and lyme disease.”124 By the
end of April 1998, a staff member of a House Agriculture
Subcommittee was quoted as saying that hearings would soon be
scheduled “that could lead to legislative changes if EPA does not
change direction in the way it is implementing the law”; the staff
member specifically emphasized the Subcommittee’s concern “that
EPA is planning to use default assumptions in reassessments of
organophosphates and a related insecticide class, carbamates, under
[the Food Protection Act].”125
Although EPA in some ways resisted the political pressure under
which it was operating, in other ways the health-protective promises
of the Food Protection Act never escaped the gravitational forces
brought to bear by the pesticide industry and its political allies. In
1999, on the eve of EPA’s deadline covering the first third of
tolerance reassessments, EPA announced a ban on 36 uses of methyl
parathion, a major organophosphate pesticide, including its use on
peaches, apples, pears, and grapes that were of special importance in
126
the diets of infants and children. And, as mentioned above, EPA
tightened tolerances on almost two dozen other organophosphates,
127
including especially chlorpyrifos, shortly thereafter. But in these
early decisions it was also evident that EPA was most likely to act
only when it had specific affirmative data suggesting an increased risk
to children—that is, “good science” showing that children faced a
danger—rather than to apply the precautionary 10-X factor whenever

123. Bert McMeen, Environmental Groups Say Panel Could Stall Law’s Implementation, 22
CHEM. REG. REP. (BNA) 147 (Apr. 17, 1998) (quoting Chrisopher Klose, a spokesman for the
American Crop Protection Association, regarding “concerns of growers, pesticide applicators
and producers, and others that science should drive public policy”).
124. See Bert McMeen, Pesticides: Results of “Rigid” EPA Policies Under FQPA Could Be
Devastating, Industry Official Says, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Apr. 24, 1998 (quoting Elin
Miller, global director for government and public affairs at Dow Agrosciences, Inc.).
125. See Bert McMeen, Pesticides: EPA’s Implementation of FQPA Could Result in Changes
to 1996 Law, House Staffer Says, DAILY ENVT. REP. (BNA), Apr. 28, 1998 (claiming also that
“[l]awmakers on three congressional committees, including the House and Senate agriculture
committees, have warned EPA to use reliable data on exposure rather than default
assumptions, and to use ‘sound science’ and consult with interested parties, before making
decisions on allowable uses of pesticides”).
126. See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103, pt. 3, at 4.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 104–10. The Consumers Union, however, noted that
EPA could have been much more aggressive in making even further restrictions on chlorpyrifos.
See CONSUMERS UNION REPORT, supra note 103, pt. 3, at 6.
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the evidence was incomplete. In its report to Congress in 2000, the
GAO found that EPA was most likely to use a 10-X safety factor
when it “identified both toxicology data gaps and evidence of
128
increased susceptibility in children.” When the scientific record was
incomplete, but the incomplete data did not contain any affirmative
evidence of harm, a safety factor “less than” 10-X was recommended,
129
often a three-fold factor (3-X). Apart from the (in)consistency of
this practice with the 10-X provisions of the Food Protection Act
itself, it is hardly clear that the practice represented “good science.”
In 2002, a majority of EPA’s Scientific Advisory Panel (SAP) who
addressed the 10-X issue “disagreed” with the Agency’s “selective
application of a 3X safety factor” and concluded that the “available
data was not sufficient to assure adequate protection with less than
the 10X FQPA safety factor.”130
But the long-term problem with the Agency’s decision not to
apply the 10-X margin of safety strictly was that it removed an
underlying incentive for pesticide manufacturers to develop the full
set of test data that might prove that lower tolerances were justified—
the very sort of empirically grounded “good science” ostensibly being
demanded. Even worse, in the absence of a 10-X factor, the industry
and its political allies actually had more maneuvering room from
which they could resist calls to produce that data. The prospect of just
such a possibility unfolded over developmental neurotoxicity tests
(DNTs). DNTs can shed light especially on those pesticides (such as
many organophosphates) that are designed to inhibit cholinesterase,
an enzyme “needed for the proper functioning of the nervous systems
of both humans and animals,” which presented special risks to
younger animals whose developing bodies were often less able to
detoxify them.131 In 2005, EPA’s Office of Research and Development
(ORD), which is described by the Agency as its office with special

128. GAO REPORT, supra note 104, at 12 (emphasis added).
129. See id. at 12–13.
130. Kristina Thayer & Jane Houlihan, Pesticides, Human Health, and the Food Quality
Protection Act, 28 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 257, 295–96 (2004) (citing FIFRA
SCI. ADVISORY PANEL, ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TRANSMITTAL OF MEETING MINUTES OF THE
FIFRA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL MEETING HELD JUNE 26–27, 2002, at 10 (2002)). Some
SAP members did accept EPA’s use of the 3-X factor, albeit “with certain reservations.” Id. at
296.
131. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION REPORT:
OPPORTUNITIES TO IMPROVE DATA QUALITY AND CHILDREN’S HEALTH THROUGH THE
FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT 8–9 (2006) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT I].

03__HORNSTEIN.DOC

1566

7/20/2007 1:44 PM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1541

132
responsibility for “sound science,” “strongly recommended” that
EPA “require a developmental neurotoxicity study for pesticide
registration.”133 But in January 2006, EPA’s Office of Inspector
General reported that “[i]ndustry representatives have said that
developmental neurotoxicity study results are difficult to interpret
and expensive to conduct.”134 Although the Agency originally
proposed regulations that would nonetheless have implemented
135
ORD’s recommendation for required DNTs, the Inspector General
reported that EPA retreated from this position after the White
House’s Office of Management and Budget “expressed its concerns
on the increasing amount of resources devoted to pesticide
registration and the amount of data required to support a new
136
registration” —concerns that the trade press described as “echo[ing]
those expressed by the pesticide industry.”137
In August 2006, EPA’s Office of Inspector General issued its
final report on the Agency’s ten-year implementation of the Food
138
Protection Act. The results were mixed. On the one hand, the
Report concluded that EPA’s actions had a measurable and positive
impact especially on the dietary risk from pesticide residues faced by

132. See Envtl. Prot. Agency, About EPA Research & Development, http://www.epa.gov/
ord/htm/aboutord.htm (last visited May 11, 2007) (“The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) relies on sound science . . . . The Office of Research and Development (ORD) is the
scientific research arm of EPA. ORD’s leading-edge research helps provide the solid
underpinning of science . . . for the Agency.”).
133. See INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT I, supra note 131, at 9 (emphasis added) (citing
OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEV., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BRIEFING BOOK AND POSTER
ABSTRACT PROVIDED TO THE BOARD OF SCIENTIFIC COUNSELORS FOR REVIEW OF ORD’S
HUMAN HEALTH RESEARCH PROGRAM ON FEB. 28, 2005, TO MAR. 2, 2005). At the time of
ORD’s recommendation, EPA only “conditionally required” DNTs, typically only when other
tests “indicate[d] the potential for adverse functional developmental effects.” See McGarity,
supra note 100, at 142–43. As EPA’s required developmental toxicity tests did not require
information about “functional deficits,” EPA as of mid-1998 had received DNTs for only six
pesticides. Id. at 143.
134. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT I, supra note 131, at 9.
135. See id. at 12 (“EPA proposed adding new requirements for developmental
neurotoxicity test data to the toxicity testing battery as part of the chemical registration
process.”).
136. Id.
137. See Dean Scott, Pesticides: EPA Should Weigh Cost-Effective Measures As It Revises
Chemical Data Rule, OMB Says, CHEM. REG. DAILY (Apr. 6, 2005) (“OMB’s cost concerns,
which echo those expressed by the pesticide industry, probably will get close examination by the
agency given OMB’s role in ultimately clearing any final version of the Part 158 revisions.”).
138. OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION REPORT:
MEASURING THE IMPACT OF THE FOOD QUALITY PROTECTION ACT: CHALLENGES AND
OPPORTUNITIES (2006) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT II].
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139
children eating domestically grown food. On the other hand, the
Report also found that “there [had] been a shift of risk to imported
foods,”140 such that “total pesticide residual risk for imported foods
141
were nearly four-times higher than those of the domestic scores.”
Although the Inspector General’s Report did not itself account for
this shift, another report issued contemporaneously by a nonprofit
organization explained that EPA had often reduced the increased risk
profiles of pesticides by accepting “labeling” changes as to how
pesticides were to be used, which apply principally to domestic
growers, rather than actually changing many tolerances, which would
apply to the food whether produced domestically or internationally.142
Although, on balance, both reports concurred that the total risk to
children from pesticides had improved under the Food Protection
Act,143 the Inspector General’s Report found that “98 percent of the
total impact of EPA actions to date” stemmed from EPA restrictions
144
on the parathions and chlorphyrifos and the nonprofit report found
that EPA’s implementation “may simply further shift risks from U.S.
grown produce to food imported from abroad.”145 By August 2006,
EPA had completed cumulative risk assessments on only one class of

139. See id. at 18 (“We found risks have declined by about two-thirds in domestically grown
foods in 16 important children’s foods included in our analysis.”).
140. Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
141. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
142. See ORGANIC CTR., supra note 112, at 28 (“The vast majority of FQPA-driven riskreduction actions have entailed changes in U.S. pesticide product labels. . . . These label-driven
changes in pesticide use patterns have in most cases not been accompanied by reductions in, or
revocation of tolerances. Label changes impact only U.S. pesticide use; tolerance changes
impact farmers here and abroad, since they apply equally to domestic and imported foods. For
this reason, U.S. farmers have been forced to adopt lower-risk use patterns, while growers
outside the U.S. have been able to continue using older, higher-risk pesticides in ways no longer
permitted in the U.S.”).
143. See id. at 30 (“The FQPA has brought about a modest to moderate reduction in
pesticide dietary risks.”); INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT II, supra note 138, at 17 (“[T]he total
dietary risk index amount (domestic and imported combined) decreased from 3,170 in 1994 to
1,532 in 2003.”).
144. INSPECTOR GENERAL REPORT II, supra note 138, at 21 (“Taken together, tolerance
revocations and reductions imposed on 8 uses of the parathions and chlorpyrifos accounted for
98 percent of the total impact of EPA actions to date on a set of 30 of the most serious domestic
‘risk drivers.’”).
145. ORGANIC CTR., supra note 112, at 30–31 (“The lack of a significant number of
[organophosphate] tolerance revocations and reductions, however, increases the chances that
new risk drivers will periodically emerge in children’s foods, especially in imported foods. This
risk is especially great during winter months when a significant share of fresh produce is
imported.”).
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146

pesticides, and had not yet determined whether there would need to
be additional cumulative analyses done involving multiple chemical
families of pesticides that share “common mode[s] of action.”147 As
EPA approached the Food Protection Act’s August 2006 deadline,
three public-employee labor unions claimed that “[i]n the rush to
meet the August 2006 FQPA statutory deadline, many steps in the
risk assessment and risk management process are being abbreviated
or eliminated in violation of the principles of scientific integrity and
objectivity by which we as public servants are bound.”148
The plausibility of considering organic agriculture as a type of
insurance against regulatory slippage is only reinforced when one
considers the prospects of future political or special-interest
distortions in the regulation of conventional pesticides. After EPA
was well underway in its implementation of the Food Protection Act,
Congress changed the general regulatory landscape by enacting in
2000 the Data Quality Act (DQA).149 The DQA was a singleparagraph rider to a massive appropriations bill enacted “without any
150
hearings or extensive legislative history.” Yet it required, among
other things, that regulatory agencies create administrative
mechanisms by which “affected persons” could “seek and obtain
correction of information” that is alleged not to comply with various
data quality–related “guidelines.”151 William Kovacs, a vice president

146. Id. at 31 (noting that, although the cumulative risk assessment on the carbamates was
“nearly complete,” by August 2006 “EPA [had] completed a cumulative risk assessment . . . on
just one family of chemistry—the [organophosphates]”).
147. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 100 (presenting the statutory requirement
regarding pesticides that share a “common mechanism of toxicity”).
148. Pesticides: Employees’ Unions Ask EPA to Regulate Organophosphates, Carbamates
Strictly, CHEM. REG. DAILY (May 26, 2006). More modestly, the EPA Inspector General
concluded in August 2006 that, despite evidence of some public-health gains made under the
statute, the Agency could not connect its actions with the broader, bottom-line question
regarding the risk of food grown by conventional agricultural inputs: “Because it lacks measures
on the impact of actions on the health of infants, children, and the overall human population,
[EPA] cannot state the impact of its . . . efforts [under the Food Protection Act].” INSPECTOR
GENERAL REPORT II, supra note 138, at 5.
149. See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat.
2763, 2763A-153 to -154 (2000).
150. Nat’l Acad. of Scis., Ensuring the Quality of Data Disseminated by the Federal
Government: Workshop #1, at 9 (Mar. 11, 2002) (statement of Dr. John Graham, the OMB
official later appointed to be in charge of administering the DQA); see also id. at 32 (statement
of Alan Morrison, Visiting Professor of Law, Stanford Law School) (“The Data Quality Act is a
statute that is quite short . . . . It is only a couple of paragraphs, and the good news and the bad
news about the legislative history is the same news. There isn’t any.”).
151. Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515, 114 Stat. at 2763A-154.
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of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, might only have slightly
exaggerated when he claimed in 2002 that the DQA “will have the
most profound impact on federal regulations since the Administrative
Procedure Act was enacted in 1946 . . . by ensuring that [the
Environmental Protection Agency] uses better science, and by giving
industry additional grounds to sue.”152
The direct ramifications of the DQA for EPA’s pesticide
programs soon became evident. The pesticide industry had
successfully pressured EPA in the name of “good science” into
abandoning blanket application of the precautionary 10-X factor and
then resisted EPA’s attempts to require unconditionally the DNT
tests that EPA scientists had recommended. The combined effect of
these two campaigns meant that EPA would become more dependent
on information produced by third parties (especially academic
researchers) about pesticides’ safety—and the DQA gave the
pesticide industry a newfound leverage point to “seek and obtain
correction of” scientific evidence with which they disagreed. The
opportunity arose over atrazine, one of the most widely used
herbicides in the country.153 Atrazine was already a suspect chemical
under the Food Protection Act. EPA’s Safety Factor Committee, in a
November 2000 report, recommended that the Act’s full 10-X safety
factor be used in assessing atrazine’s risks,154 in part because studies at
EPA’s National Health and Environmental Effects Laboratory had
found evidence that atrazine can cause neuroendocrine alterations in
animals’ development, such as disruption of “critical reproductive
processes including puberty.”155 This was of special concern to
atrazine’s manufacturer, Syngenta, which persuaded EPA in January
2003 to relax atrazine’s safety factor to 3-X on the basis of new
exposure data.156

152. OMB Guidelines on Quality of Information Seen As Having Profound Impact on
Agencies, 33 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 146 (Jan. 18, 2002), cited in Donald T. Hornstein, Accounting
for Science: The Independence of Public Research in the New, Subterranean Administrative Law,
66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227, 228 (Autumn 2003).
153. See Goldie Blumenstyk, The Story of Syngenta and Tyrone Hayes at UC Berkeley: The
Price of Research, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Oct. 31, 2003, at A26.
154. See Memorandum from Brenda Tarplee, Executive Secretary, FQPA Safety Factor
Committee to Catherine Eiden, Risk Assessor, Reregistration Branch 3, at 1 (Nov. 14, 2000) (on
file with the Duke Law Journal) (“The [Safety Factor Committee] concluded that the FQPA
safety factor should be retained at 10x when assessing parent atrazine and its chlorometabolites . . . .”).
155. Id. at 5.
156. See Thayer & Houlihan, supra note 130, at 311 tbl.6, 312 n.266.
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The possibility of endocrine-disruption effects of atrazine
became highlighted between 2000 and 2003. In part, this was because
the Food Protection Act had required EPA to develop a special
screening program specifically to test for pesticides’ estrogenic and
other endocrine-related effects, a program which the Agency had not
yet implemented.157 But in larger part, it was because a former
Syngenta consultant, Dr. Tyrone Hayes of the University of
California at Berkeley, had published a widely noted article in April
2002 in a prestigious peer-reviewed journal finding that atrazine, at
levels a fraction of those allowed under federal drinking-water
regulations, triggered the production of estrogen in the sex organs of
male frogs, causing them to grow ovaries and eggs.158
Contemporaneously, an EPA risk assessment on atrazine identified
the potential endocrine-related effects of atrazine as “an endpoint
that warrants additional study.” By summer 2002, EPA faced a
petition to withdraw atrazine from the market, citing Hayes’s
published work.159
Enter the DQA. In November 2002, EPA received a “Request
for Correction” under the Data Quality Act regarding its risk
assessment of atrazine, filed by the Kansas Corn Growers Association
and the Triazine Network, two organizations representing growers
160
who used atrazine. The Request was joined by the Center for
Regulatory Effectiveness (CRE), an industrial lobbying group, and
161
written by CRE’s founder, Jim Tozzi, who has repeatedly been
credited with having drafted the DQA itself.162 The Request vilified

157. Id. at 284 (“FQPA mandates that EPA develop a program to test for endocrine
disrupting effects . . . . to be implemented by 1999. EPA, however, is still years away from
implementing an endocrine screening and testing program.”).
158. See Blumenstyk, supra note 153 (referring to Hayes’s first article appearing in the April
2002 Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences and, two months later, being referenced
in a petition by the Natural Resources Defense Council to EPA to withdraw atrazine from the
market).
159. Id.
160. See Ctr. for Regulatory Effectiveness, Data Quality Act Request for Correction, Nov.
25, 2002 [hereinafter Request for Correction] (on file with the Duke Law Journal) (stating that
“EPA’s statements in the atrazine Environmental Risk Assessment regarding atrazine’s
purported endocrine effects violate government wide data quality standards”) (italics omitted).
161. Id.
162. See Alexander Nathan Hecht, Administrative Process in an Information Age: The
Transformation of Agency Action Under the Data Quality Act, 31 J. LEGIS. 233, 259 (2005)
(“The DQA is commonly regarded as the brainchild of Jim Tozzi, an industry lobbyist with the
Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, a pro-business think-tank located in Washington, D.C.”);
Michelle V. Lacko, The Data Quality Act: Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy?, 53 EMORY L.J.
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EPA for “bad science” for merely having referenced Hayes’s study,
even though EPA had referred only to Dr. Hayes’s findings as
hypotheses and had only mildly credited those findings as warranting
“additional testing with atrazine-treated tadpoles and adult frogs . . .
to determine what, if any, effects occur on reproduction.”164 The
Request demanded that the risk assessment be reissued to “state that
there is no reliable evidence that atrazine causes endocrine effects in
the environment.”165
In January 2003, the Agency conceded to the Requesters just
enough for them to proclaim victory. To the Agency’s credit, the
Agency refused to “reissue” its risk assessment, as the Requesters
had demanded, to state affirmatively that there was “no reliable
166
evidence” that atrazine causes environmental endocrine effects. On
the other hand, EPA promised that it would be “clarifying” its risk
assessment “to avoid any future misunderstanding of the Agency’s

305, 307 (2004) (“Jim Tozzi, head of the corporate-sponsored Center for Regulatory
Effectiveness (CRE) has boldly taken credit for the development and implementation of the
DQA.”); id. at 307 n.14 (“Jim Tozzi . . . persuaded Representative Jo Ann Emerson to quietly
insert the Act into [Pub. L. No. 106-554] . . . .”); Wendy E. Wagner, Science in the Regulatory
Process: The “Bad Science” Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate Over the Role of Science in Public
Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 68 n.24 (Autumn 2003)
(“It also appears from the oral history that it was an industrial lobbyist and not a congressional
staffer that drafted and guided the rider through Congress.”); James T. O’Reilly, The 411 on
515: How OIRA’s Expanded Information Roles in 2002 Will Impact Rule-Making and Agency
Publicity Actions, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 835, 840 n.20 (2002) (“Discussion at the American Bar
Association Fall Administrative Law Conference dinner . . . honoring past directors of the
OIRA, suggested that Jim Tozzi, former OIRA director, had been the principal drafter of the
515 language . . . .”).
163. See Request for Correction, supra note 160, at 3 (“This sub-section of the risk
assessment first describes, without criticism, atrazine tests perform by Dr. Tyrone Hayes on
frogs.”), 8 (“The Triazine Network’s goal is to ensure an outcome to EPA’s atrazine review
based on sound science. The Environmental Risk Assessment’s statements regarding atrazine’s
endocrine effects adversely affect this goal because they are not based on sound science.”); see
also id. (“EPA’s Environmental Risk Assessment’s statements regarding atrazine’s endocrine
effects fuel and encourage public misperceptions regarding atrazine . . . [and] must be corrected
now in order to stop this flood of misinformation and bad science.”).
164. Id. at 3 (citing selected portions of EPA’s risk assessment and concluding, “[t]hus,
EPA’s Environmental Risk Assessment accepts the endocrine effects allegedly shown by the
Hayes Frog Tests as accurate and reliable . . . [and] the only remaining question is whether those
endocrine effects affect frogs’ ability to reproduce”).
165. Id. at 1.
166. See Letter from Marcia E. Mulkey, Director, Office of Pesticide Programs to Jere
White, Executive Director, Kansas Corn Growers Association (Jan. 30, 2003) (on file with the
Duke Law Journal) (“We believe that it would be inappropriate to amend the Environmental
Risk Assessment for atrazine as you suggested because it is premature to conclude that there is
no reliable evidence that atrazine causes ‘endocrine effects’ in the environment.”).
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167
position on the environmental effects of atrazine.” In March 2003,
the Agency reiterated that it could not state that “there is no reliable
evidence that atrazine causes endocrine effects in the environment”
but nonetheless revised the risk assessment so that it “does not
suggest that endocrine disruption, or potential effects on endocrinemediated pathways, be regarded as a legitimate regulatory endpoint
at this time.”168 Although the Agency subsequently summarized its
actions as reflecting only “minor editorial changes,”169 the Requesters
thereafter crowed that “EPA in large part agreed with CRE’s Data
170
Quality Act Petition . . . .” And it is hard not to agree that the
Requesters’ DQA petition had a significant effect. In June 2003,
EPA’s Scientific Advisory Panel met specifically to evaluate the data
on atrazine’s potential developmental effects on amphibians.
Although the SAP found that Hayes’s and other experimenters’ data
presented various procedural inconsistencies and uncertainties as to
the underlying hypothesis, all of the SAP panel members “agreed that
sufficient data existed to warrant concern.”171 Thus, precisely when
the data were incomplete and the Food Protection Act might be
thought to encourage the Agency to consider further precautionary
margins of safety over and above those already in place, the DQA
petition on atrazine resulted in the Agency delaying this possibility as
a regulatory “endpoint.” At the very least, the DQA bought
atrazine’s producers and users more time. The SAP is scheduled to
reconsider atrazine’s environmental effects on amphibians in October

167. Id.
168. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Response to Comments from Syngenta and Its Contractors
18–19
(Mar.
26,
2003),
http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/
2807Response_03_27_03.pdf (emphasis added).
169. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, INFORMATION QUALITY FY03 ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2004),
available at http://www.epa.gov/quality/informationguidelines/documents/EPA_IQG_FY03_
Annual_Report.pdf.
170. Center for Regulatory Effectiveness, Comments by the Center for Regulatory
Effectiveness on Docket OPP-2003-0024, at 2, http://www.thecre.com/pdf/20030811_frogsap.pdf.
171. See FIFRA SCIENTIFIC ADVISORY PANEL (SAP) REPORT, POTENTIAL
DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF ATRAZINE ON AMPHIBIANS (Aug. 4, 2003), at 17–18,
http://www.epa.gov/scipoly/sap/meetings/2003/june/junemeetingreport.pdf
(“The
Panel
concurred with the Agency’s determination that the laboratory studies on the effects of atrazine
on anuran gonadal development are sufficient to hypothesize that atrazine interferes with
normal development . . . [f]ive studies detected abnormalities of gonadal development . . . [and]
[t]he inability to detect gonadal development [in two unpublished studies] should not detract
from the positive results noted in the majority of the studies.”).
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172
2007; meanwhile, the Bush Administration’s requested 2008 budget
includes reductions in EPA’s chemical-screening projects, with its
“endocrine disruptors program” taking “the largest hit.”173
The point of the atrazine episode, of course, is not to claim that
consumers of organic agriculture avoid a risk that can be, at this time,
precisely quantified. Rather, it is to underscore the plausibility that
the premium paid for organic food is rationally related to the danger
that regulatory decisions on conventional agriculture, ostensibly
grounded in “good science,” in fact reflect political- and specialinterest pressures. Indeed, the special dangers of the Data Quality
Act continue to unfold. In January 2006, the White House Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) cited the DQA as its principal
statutory authority for a proposed “Risk Assessment Bulletin” that
would regularize risk assessments across the federal government.174
Immediately upon its publication, the proposed Bulletin was referred
175
for scientific review to a panel of the National Academy of Sciences.
To be sure, it was unclear from the outset whether the Bulletin would
affect EPA’s regulation of pesticides: the proposed bulletin exempted
risk assessments for individual permitting and licensing decisions,176
which seemed to exclude individual pesticide registrations and reregistrations, but expressly was meant to apply to “risk assessments
performed with respect to classes of products,”177 which EPA
understood to cover tolerance-setting under the Food Protection

172. See Pesticides: EPA to Discuss Atrazine Studies with Panel, Asks for Submission of
Additional Studies, CHEM. REG. DAILY (Apr. 5, 2007).
173. See Pat Phibbs-Rizzuto, Budget: EPA Endocrine Disruption Work Targeted for
Funding Cut in FY 2008 Budget Proposal, CHEM. REG. DAILY (Feb. 8, 2007) (“The endocrine
program also would lose three full-time staff members” and “may postpone the validation of
mammal assays, interlaboratory trials, and initial screening of the first set of potential
endocrine-disrupting chemicals . . . .”).
174. Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin, 71 Fed. Reg. 2,600 (proposed Jan. 17, 2006). OMB
lists the “Information Quality Act” as the first of the statutory authorities claimed to support
the proposed Bulletin. OMB BULLETIN, supra note 32, at 7.
175. Proposed Risk Assessment Bulletin, 71 Fed. Reg. at 2,600 (stating in the announcement
of the proposed Bulletin that OMB “has referred [it] to the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS), for their expert review”).
176. OMB BULLETIN, supra note 32, at 10 (“This Bulletin does not apply to risk assessments
that arise in the course of individual agency adjudications or permit proceedings, unless the
agency determines that: (1) compliance with the Bulletin is practical and appropriate and (2) the
risk assessment is scientifically or technically novel or likely to have precedent-setting influence
on future adjudications and/or permit proceedings.”).
177. Id.
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178
Act. To the extent this was true, OMB’s proposed risk assessment
standards would have undermined, in the name of data “quality,” the
very value judgments Congress had written into the Act. In early
179
2007, the NAS scientific review panel issued its report. Generally,
the NAS panel concluded that as a scientific matter the OMB
Bulletin was “fundamentally flawed,” possessed “the potential for
negative impacts on the practice of risk assessment in the federal
government,” and “could not be rescued.”180 Specifically, among its
findings that could have affected the safety of conventional
agriculture, the NAS panel found that the OMB Bulletin would have
downplayed what counted as an adverse health “effect” in such a way
as to minimize the assessment of cholinesterase-inhibiting effects of
181
organophosphate and carbamate insecticides. Worse, the NAS
panel found that OMB’s proposed Bulletin presented steps, in the
name of science, that would understate risks presented to vulnerable
subpopulations,182 including especially children, infants, and fetuses.183
And perhaps most telling of all for the purposes of my argument, the
proposed Bulletin would have insisted on the Agency communicating
what OMB thought to be the relevant risk “comparisons,” such as
whether a risk was hypothetically akin to “being struck by lightning,”
whereas as to those risks presented by conventional agriculture, the
proposed Bulletin would have ignored completely that there existed a
real-life, market-based alternative to pesticide risks—federally
certified organic foods—for which the comparative data suggest a
much lower risk of pesticide residues.184

178. See NAS REPORT, supra note 33, app. E, at 268 (citing EPA comments on the proposed
Bulletin specifically objecting to the fact that “the proposed Bulletin did indicate that actions
that involve assessment / reassessment of tolerances for pesticide residues on food would be
subject to the Bulletin”).
179. See id.
180. Id. at 7.
181. See id. at 57 (“Toxicologic risk assessment of these insecticides could be based on an
end point related to the mode of action (for example, a drop in acetylcholinesterase to 70% of
baseline) even if exposed people have no symptoms at that concentration.”).
182. See, e.g., id. at 37–39 (criticizing the Bulletin’s use of mean or “central” estimates of risk
because they do not accurately reflect the risks posed to the most vulnerable populations).
183. See id. at 80 (speaking of the need to consider specially vulnerable populations such as
infants and children and then noting, “[h]owever, if implemented literally and in the absence of
clarifying language, the bulletin may be interpreted as requiring only quantitative analyses and
only for the general population”) (emphasis added).
184. See supra text accompanying notes 112–14.

03__HORNSTEIN.DOC

2007]

7/20/2007 1:44 PM

ORGANIC AGRICULTURE

1575

C. Organic Agriculture as a Hedge in a Genetically- and CarbonModified World
Because it is increasingly legitimate to claim in policy debates
that there exists value in organic food vis-à-vis the still-uncertain risks
of pesticide residues, those who belittle organic farming find it
necessary to shift the reference point from which they argue. They
now claim that the proper comparative reference point is not the
conventional, pesticide-based agriculture of the “past,” but new
systems of agriculture that integrate advances in biotechnology. Using
the new technologies of genetic engineering, the argument goes, “is
actually good for humans and the environment, because it allows
farmers to spray less of the toxic chemicals required to foil pests and
weeds.”185 Before addressing this argument on its merits, it is worth
noting at the outset the sleight-of-hand embedded in the new framing:
pesticides, which in the past were heralded mainly for their benefits
by opponents of organic agriculture are now to be counted as costs
from which we can be delivered by genetic engineering.
That said, however, the new line of argumentation does not
entirely lack plausibility. The two most common applications of
bioengineering can at least stake a claim that they might offer health
and environmental improvements over conventional agriculture. The
first, so-called “Bt crops,” involves genetically modified seeds that
replicate within the plants grown from them a naturally occurring
bacterium, Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt), that produces a protein which
can kill pests who ingest it—thereby reducing the need to spray
insecticides broadly over agricultural fields.186 The second, so-called
“Roundup Ready crops,” involves crops that are genetically
engineered to be resistant to Monsanto’s herbicide, Roundup, which
can in turn be sprayed more freely over both weeds and crops alike—
thereby increasing the ability to use herbicides in “no-till” programs

185. Sophia Kolehmainen, Genetically Engineered Agriculture: Precaution Before Profits:
An Overview of Issues in Genetically Engineered Food and Crops, 20 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 267, 285
(2001) (“Another common claim is that genetic engineering of crops is actually good for humans
and the environment, because it allows farmers to spray less of the toxic chemicals required to
foil pests and weeds.”); see also Matthew Rich, Note, The Debate Over Genetically Modified
Crops in the United States: Reassessment of Notions of Harm, Difference, and Choice, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 889, 893 (2004) (“[S]upporters argue that genetically modified crops feed
starving populations, reduce pesticide and herbicide use, and conserve environmental
resources.”); Bailey, supra note 73 (“Finally, no-till farmers use less insecticide, since genetically
enhanced crops can protect themselves against pests.”).
186. Kolehmainen, supra note 185, at 273.
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that can, among other things, reduce soil erosion and the pollution of
187
nearby surface streams from farm run-off. The advent of genetic
engineering in agriculture has been described as “the fastest growing
188
agricultural development in history.” Bt-corn alone accounts for
one-third of all corn grown in the United States189 and Roundup
Ready soybeans account for eighty-five percent of the country’s
190
soybean plantings. Thus, in terms of modern trends in agriculture,
genetic engineering and organic agriculture, as different as they may
be, have both emerged as especially strong, competing agricultural
191
paradigms and therefore it is hardly implausible to compare them.
But for the purposes of my argument, it is neither necessary nor
desirable to compare the two as either-or propositions. Indeed, too
often policy debates over agriculture are framed as if the world must
192
be either an all-organic or all-bioengineered place. Yet there is an
important middle ground that justifies organic agriculture—and
indeed justifies its expansion beyond (and perhaps even significantly
beyond) the relatively small amount of total acreage currently under
organic management. In addition to its other benefits, organic
agriculture is justified as a form of social insurance—a hedge—against
the prospect that bioengineered agriculture will fail.193
And, at least as to the claim of overall pesticide reduction, there
is evidence that genetically engineered crops are not living up to their

187. See, e.g., Thomas P. Redick, The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety: Precautionary
Priority in Biotech Crop Approvals and Containment of Commodities Shipments, 18 COLO. J.
INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 83–84 (Winter 2007) (arguing that Roundup Ready soybeans “and
no-till practices made possible through use of this soybean have increased soil conservation
measurably”).
188. Holly Beth Frompovicz, Comment, A Growing Controversy: Genetic Engineering in
Agriculture, 17 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 265, 267 (2006).
189. Id. at 267.
190. Id.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 29–31 (noting that organic foods constitute the
fastest growing segment of the agricultural market).
192. See, e.g., Ronald Bailey, Billions Served: Norman Borlaug Interviewed by Ronald
Bailey, REASONONLINE, Apr. 2000, http://www.reason.com/news/show/27665.html (“[I]f all
agriculture were organic, you would have to increase cropland area dramatically, spreading out
into marginal areas and cutting down millions of acres of forests.”).
193. This justification for organic agriculture is complementary to, but distinct from, the
more commonly made arguments that genetically engineered agriculture is bad. See, e.g.,
Frompovicz, supra note 188, at 271 (“If the Roundup resistance trait spread to wild grasses, it
could result in weeds that would be resistant to the most widely used weed killer.”); Rich, supra
note 185, at 896–97 (describing the genetic contamination of endangered varieties of Mexican
corn).
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promise: although Bt crops have reduced insecticide use in many
crops, herbicide-tolerant (HT) crops, such as those that are
“Roundup Ready,” have increased it by greater amounts. The reason
for the increase in HT crop treatments involves the advent of weeds
that are increasingly tolerant and/or resistant to glyphosate, the active
ingredient in Roundup which could otherwise be sprayed on fields
194
planted with Roundup Ready crops. A recent report on long-term
experience with HT crops finds a predictable pattern: “[i]n the first
two years of commercial use, each acre planted to HT cotton reduced
herbicide use by about one-third pound[; e]fficiency slipped in years
three and four . . . . [and] [b]y year five, weed shifts, tolerance, and
resistance had pushed total herbicide use on HT acres to a level 0.23
pounds above total herbicide use on conventional acres.”195 Across all
crops, genetically engineered varieties reduced pesticide use an
aggregate 20.6 million pounds from 1996 through 1998, “but from
1999 through 2004, pesticide use rose 143 million pounds, for a net
increase of 122 million pounds over the full nine-year period.”196
Although it is possible that this resistance problem might be
197
addressed with active resistance-management programs, there have
been other complications for bioengineered crops. In 2006, a
university study of Bt cotton in China found that the emergence of
secondary pests (those not targeted by the Bt insecticide) has

194. See, e.g., Paul L. Hollis, Herbicide Resistance Major Concern in Cotton, DELTA FARM
PRESS, Mar. 2, 2007, at 43 (quoting Stanley Culpepper, a University of Georgia weed specialist,
“As farmers continue to plant successive seasons of Roundup Ready cotton, Roundup Ready
soybeans and Roundup Ready corn, it’s only a matter of time before glyphosate resistance
occurs”); Jim Langcuster, Herbicide Resistance Haunts Growers, SE. FARM PRESS, Feb. 14, 2007,
at 14 (“With mounting concern, weed scientists throughout the region—and the world—are
cataloguing a growing list of weeds that have developed resistance to glyphosate, which
comprises the cornerstone of crop planting systems throughout the Southeast.”); David Howe,
Sizing Up Glyphosate Complaints, CORN & SOYBEAN DIG., Jan. 1, 2007, at 19 (indicating that
Indiana and Illinois are among states where glysophate resistance has been documented).
195. Charles M. Benbrook, Genetically Engineered Crops and Pesticide Use in the United
States: The First Nine Years 26 (BioTech InfoNet Technical Paper No. 7, 2004), available at
http://www.biotech-info.net/technicalpaper7.html (emphasis added) (adding that, even after the
five-year mark, the rapid rise of glysophate-resistant marestail triggered, in 2004, “an estimated
10 percent increase in the average pounds of herbicides applied per acre”).
196. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
197. See Monsanto Launches Online Weed Resistance Program, DELTA FARM PRESS, Mar.
30, 2007, at 20 (“Monsanto is launching an online Weed Resistance Risk Assessment Program
for growers who use Roundup Ready weed control technology.”).
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required farmers, after seven years, “to use just as much pesticide as
198
they did with conventional crops.”
Against the possibility that bioengineered agriculture might not
fully live up to its environmental claims, the possibility of sustainable
gains from organic agriculture is especially noteworthy. In 2005, a 22year longitudinal study in the United States comparing conventional
and organic farming of corn and soybeans found that yields were
generally identical even though the organic fields used 30 percent less
199
energy, less water, and no pesticides. Although these results are not
generalizable to all crops,200 even modest decreases in yield in organic
systems might be offset by environmental gains elsewhere. Thus, a
Swiss study that also compared (different) organic and conventional
farming systems across a 20-year period found that, despite decreases
in yield for some crops, organic farms produced their crops more
“efficiently”: with less energy, greater water retention by the soil, and
a higher presence of beneficial insects.201 The existence of an
agricultural production system such as organic farming may be an

198. See, e.g., Steve Connor, Farmers Use As Much Pesticide With GM Crops, US Study
Finds, INDEP., July 27, 2006, at 23 (“Secondary pests, such as a type of leaf bug called mirids, are
not normally a problem in cotton fields because bollworm, and sprays against bollworm, tend to
keep them in check. However, because Bt cotton is targeted mainly against bollworm, other
pests are able to exploit the relatively low use of pesticide that such fields need.”); Clive
Cookson, GM Cotton Crop Develops New Pests, FIN. TIMES, July 28, 2006, at 7 (citing a joint
study by Cornell University and the Centre for Chinese Agricultural Policy that found that
“[m]ost of the benefits of growing genetically modified cotton, the only commercial GM crop in
China, have disappeared after seven years”); Molly McElroy, Pest Concerns Raised in ModifiedSeed Study Chinese Cotton Farmers Using Monsanto Product Face Secondary Pests, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 26, 2006, at A10 (“The researchers found that in the first three years of
using Bt cotton, the Chinese farmers cut pesticide use by 70 percent and earned 36 percent more
income than farmers using traditional cotton. But the environmental and economic benefits did
not last. After seven years, the Bt cotton farmers were using as much pesticide as non-Bt users,
even as they were paying for seeds that cost two to three times as much . . . .”).
199. See Susan S. Lang, Organic Farming Produces Same Corn and Soybean Yields as
Conventional Farms, but Consumes Less Energy and no Pesticides, Study Finds, CORNELL
UNIV. NEWS SERVICE, July 13, 2005, http://www.news.cornell.edu/stories/July05/organic.farm.vs.
other.ssl.html (reporting on research published in the journal Bioscience by Dr. David
Pimentel).
200. Id. (“Organic farming can compete effectively in growing corn, soybeans, wheat, barley
and other grains, Pimentel said, but it might not be as favorable for growing such crops as
grapes, apples, cherries and potatoes, which have greater pest problems.”).
201. See Bailey, supra note 73, at 2–4 (describing a study by Swiss scientists at the Research
Institute for Organic Agriculture finding that organic plots were “on average 20 percent less
productive than conventional plots” with some mineral depletion but that the organic plots were
more “efficient” due to the lesser amount of energy used to produce the crops, greater water
retention by the soil, and “higher presence of beneficial insects”).
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especially valuable asset in an age of global warming, when both
temperatures and drought are expected to increase due to the
202
cumulative effects of such greenhouse gases as carbon dioxide. In
such a carbon-modified world, organic systems could be expected to
deliver “higher yields [than conventional systems], especially under
drought conditions [because] wind and water erosion degraded the
soil on the conventional farm while the soil on the organic farm
steadily improved in organic matter, moisture, microbial activity and
other soil quality indicators.”203 Moreover, the more energy-efficient
organic systems could reduce in the first place emissions of
greenhouse gases into the atmosphere from lower, farm-related fossil
fuel use.204
The point of the comparison, although modest, is important.
Even when measured against the newer worlds of genetically
engineered crops and global warming, the existence of a vibrant
organic agricultural sector is an important national (indeed, global)
asset that is justified on policy, and not simply “marketing,” grounds.
CONCLUSION
When Congress enacted the Organic Food Production Act in
1990 it stepped onto the “other road” suggested by Rachel Carson
several decades earlier. With the relatively simple expedient of a
certification regime, the OFPA is perhaps one of our best examples of
cause-based environmental reforms that support fundamental change
in production systems toward more ecological and sustainable ends.
Organic agriculture, whether measured against conventional or
bioengineered agricultural systems, is more than an idea whose time

202. See, e.g., Caroline Patton, An Environmentalist’s Unlikely Foe: The Use of Hypothetical
Jurisdiction in Massachusetts v. EPA, 30 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & POL’Y J. 173, 182 (2006)
(“Most scientists expect global warming to result in rising sea levels, increased storms and
drought, and a general disruption of the earth’s ecosystems.”); Bradford C. Monk, Standing and
Global Warming: Is Injury to All Injury to None?, 35 ENVTL. L. 1, 15 (2005) (“Global warming
would also likely produce erratic and severe weather patterns that would increase both the
duration and intensity of droughts . . . .”).
203. Lang, supra note 199 (reporting on actual results from a U.S. study on yields from
organic fields during drought conditions).
204. DAVID PIMENTEL, IMPACTS OF ORGANIC FARMING ON EFFICIENCY OF ENERGY USE
IN AGRICULTURE 8, available at http://www.organic-center.org/reportfiles/ENERGY_SSR.pdf
(“A comparison of the model organic and conventional system suggests a 31 percent energy
saving in the organic system . . . .”).
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has come. It is an effective, proven policy alternative whose day
should be just beginning.

